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A rallying cry in some sectors of cognitive science, the embodiment of 
language is understood here in the full content of meaning of 
phenomenological tradition to help assess the remaining distance from 
neuroscience to a science of language, provided that tracking down in the 
brain neural events correlative of verbal behavior would not be sufficient. 
From an eidetic standpoint, one must build the transition between 
perceptive, pragmatic and semantic morphologies. From the point of view of 
subjective experience, one must understand how it is possible that we move 
from our sensory and kinaesthetic experiences to verbal expressions of a 
sense that could be shared by others. That is why, in order to prevent neglect 
of any dimension of embodiment of language, we would rather plead for a 
threefold approach than concede that the current naturalistic mode is the 
only possible. 
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1. The ‘Embodiment of Language’: A Spectrum of Possible Meanings 
 
The expression ‘embodiment of language’ refers to a new trend of research on the 
neural basis of language. Apart from a convenient label to bring together 
different research teams, this expression suggests that there is a special 
relationship between language and the body. The philosophical observer may 
wonder whether he will find in it the traditional philosophical problem of the 
incarnation of mind. But, as it would be foolish to project interpretations of a 
philosopher on empirical science, we should first get familiar with the use of 
‘embodiment’ by the researchers themselves. If we try to consider all the 
contributions to the investigation of the brain bases of language without omitting 
any of the protagonists in the ongoing controversy (cf. Dinstein et al. 2008; Hickok 
2008; Lotto et al. 2008; Mahon & Caramazza 2008; Lingnau et al. 2009; Scott et al. 
2009), we will find a spectrum of, at first sight not very homogeneous, uses: Are 
these different uses of the term ‘embodiment’ mutually compatible, and can they 
be reduced to one unequivocal sense? That is no mere pedantic tinkering aimed 
at the semantic correctness of scientific discourse. My suspicion is that the fashion 
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of embodiment makes us underestimate the difficulty of naturalizing the study of 
language. Rooting language in the body, without worrying too much on how to 
do it, are we not tempted to believe abolished the distance between our material 
nature and the logical ideality of meaning, between empirical data and the lived 
experience of meaning? 
 
1.1. From Modularity to Interaction  
 
After the provocative revival of Gall’s Phrenology by Fodor (1983), it looked as 
though major cognitive functions, such as object or sentence recognition, could be 
fully carried out by specialized peripheral systems that operate independently of 
each other without exchanging information, so that the organism, in spite of its 
anatomic unity, is like a hydra at the cognitive point of view. The contribution of 
brain imaging in a study previously limited to the observation of deficits due to 
brain lesions made possible a new approach on the foundations of language. This 
new approach suggests that its functions are not underpinned by specialized 
modules but rather by an extensive network of distinct areas of the brain that 
sustain a permanent dialogue with each other (cf. Wise et al. 1991; Démonet et al. 
1992; Bookheimer 2002). Such research tends assuredly to some form of embodi-
ment: the recovery of the integrative unity of the organism on its fragmentation 
into multiple modules. Even more interestingly, the recognition of the 
interdependence between widely distributed brain regions at the basis of 
language opened the way for revolutionary assumptions about the direction of 
their mutual interactions during verbal behavior. 
 
1.2. The Motor System Not a Mere Output 
 
The classic model of the bases of language (cf. Lichtheim 1885, Geschwind 1965) 
strictly subordinates the production of speech sounds by articulators to the 
cognitive processing of linguistic information. This model limits the contribution 
of the motor system to the role of slavishly executing a motor program developed 
elsewhere in auditory areas and in the upper levels of the hierarchy of the 
cognitive system. This representation of the muscular production of speech rests 
on the traditional prejudice concerning the body as an instrument of thought. 
This prejudice is shaken by the discovery of retroactive influences, sometimes 
modulatory and sometimes formative, performed by the articulator system on 
auditory reception and semantic interpretation of phonemes and expressions (cf. 
Gentilucci et al. 2001, Fadiga et al. 2002). This rehabilitation of the cognitive 
function of movement in speech amounts to an embodiment of language. 
 
1.3. Binding Doesn’t Need Abstract Supramodal Computation 
 
The synthesis of sensory qualities of perceived objects raises, at the level of the 
neuron or neuronal group, the problem of binding of unimodal signals of 
different pathways: visual, auditory, olfactory, vestibular, proprioceptive, and 
visceral in a supramodal concept of the object (cf. von der Malsburg 1995). This 
integration function is classically delegated to a central cognitive system hierar-
chically superior to the various sensory systems and exerting an influence on 
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their operation, especially through the orientation of attention (cf. Norman & 
Shallice 1980).This hypothesis of a purely conceptual, amodal thus disembodied, 
center is unlikely given the ubiquity of the mixture of influences of the various 
modalities that occurs at synaptic connections. The introduction of a transversal 
process of integration between modalities would allow us to dispense with this 
hypothesis, assuming that the motor system is able to preform perception 
through action (cf. Rizzolatti et al. 1994; Umilta et al. 1994; Skipper et al. 2007).  
 
1.4. From Mentalese to ‘the Language of Neurons’ 
 
In the history of cognitive science Chomskyan idea of competence, with its strict 
distinction as to performance and its priority over the latter for the study of lang-
uage has had a founding role (cf. Chomsky 1965). This distinction, and hierarchy 
resulting from it, tended to assimilate the core structure of the linguistic 
capability of man to a language of symbolic logic and its implementation to an 
application of syntactic rules to strings of symbols (a calculus). Once the language 
of thought has been internalized in this deep structure its realization in acts of 
communication could only appear as a contingent coating surface structure. The 
mind’s Mentalese, following Fodor (1975), limited the contribution of neuro-
science to the study of language to the realization of the logical structure of 
competence in a brain-machine indifferent to its program. A recent alternative to 
this ideology, the identification of linguistic information processing with neural 
dynamics itself and its laws of association is yet another form of embodiment of 
language (cf. Pulvermüller 2002).  
 
1.5. Broca’s Area: An All-Purpose Processor of Complexity 
 
Whether converging or diverging, the various trends expressing themselves 
through the theme of embodiment are represented in the debate on the 
interpretation of the functions of Broca’s area. Traditionally regarded as a center 
for motor realization of speech at the end of cognitive processing, the 
contribution of Broca’s area was found to take place earlier and to be more 
complex, since it is recruited at all levels of verbal conduct: for perception as well 
as for production, for syntactic construction as well as for semantic interpretation 
(cf. Nishitani et al. 2005; Fadiga & Craighero 2006; Tettamanti & Weniger 2006). 
This redefinition of the linguistic functions of Broca’s area coupled with a phylo-
genetic hypothesis put forward by Rizzolatti & Arbib (1998) about its origins in a 
monkey’s premotor area site of mirror neurons crosses the issue of embodiment: 
Should we assign this key node in the brain circuits of language to the motor 
system? Or should we not rather focus on the emancipation of this area from its 
former utilitarian functions and the acquisition by it of a capacity to process any 
multimodal cognitive complexity, such as syntactic dependencies between items 
at non rigid positions whether in the word order or in any sequence, including 
arbitrary symbols, musical sounds and motor acts parts of a goal-oriented action 
(cf. Tettamanti et al. 2009; Fadiga et al. 2010)? The conflict of interpretations on the 
function of Broca’s area shows that concerning the relationship between language 
and the body empirical research has not resulted in a generally accepted doctrine 
which may discharge of its responsibilities the philosophical reflection on 
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embodiment, a reflection to which it might be time to return for a much-needed 
guidance. 
 
 
2. That Neuroscience Cannot Do Without a  Phenomenology of Language 
 
On ne comprendra jamais ces deux idées à la fois si l’on continue d’osciller 
entre la notion de «motricité» et celle «d’intelligence», et si l’on ne découvre 
pas une troisième notion qui permette de les intégrer, une fonction, la même 
à tous les niveaux, qui soit à l’œuvre aussi bien dans les préparations 
cachées de la parole que dans les phénomènes articulaires, qui porte tout 
l’édifice du langage, et qui cependant se stabilise en processus relativement 
autonomes.1               (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 228) 
 
One will not fail to note in passing that the well-known promoter of the 
phenomenology of the body, far from being uniquely concerned with bodily 
experience, was fully aware of the importance of being clear about the 
implementation of functions and processes of language. Does recent work on the 
cerebral bases of language have surpassed this vacillation between motricity and 
representation? As everyone knows, such work is divided into two schools: 
Theory of Mind (cf. Premack & Woodruf 1978; Frith & Frith 1999) and Simulation 
(cf. Goldman 1989, 1992) or Embodiment (cf. Gallese & Goldman 1998; Gallese 
2001), although some researchers are leaving the path of controversy for a search 
for complementarity (cf. Schippers et al. 2009, 2010). Is this a confirmation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s diagnosis? His remark would shift from diagnosis to prognosis 
and even premonition: Should we go that far? The turn taken by empirical re-
search barely helps to fix our ideas.  
 
2.1. Let’s Not Replace Questions of Essence with Evolutionary Narratives 
 
The concern of biologists for the evolutionary origins of human capabilities may 
sometimes cause puzzlement to the philosopher. It may seem natural to think 
that the primary issue of any inquiry, philosophical, empirical, or otherwise, is 
the question “What is it?” a question concerning the essence of the thing itself 
and not its becoming, its origins, its cause, its effects, etc. The transition from a 
study of language to a study of its neural basis led to a replacement of “What is 
it?” by “Where did that come from?” even though the story answering the second 
question does not necessarily provide the definition expected in response to the 
first (cf. Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; Corballis 2002, 2004, 2011; Fadiga & Craighero 
2007). Moreover, blurring the differences can be detrimental to our under-
standing: If speaking, hearing and understanding are to be conceived henceforth 
as species of movement or imitation of movement, surely our concepts of move-
ment and of speech will have to be altered. Will moving still mean moving one’s 
body and will understanding someone still mean knowing what he means?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    1 ‘We will never understand these two ideas at once if we continue to oscillate between the 
notions of “motricity” and of “intelligence”, and if one does not discover a third concept that 
allows to integrate both of them, a function, the same at all levels, that is at work both in the 
hidden preparations of speech and in the articulator processes, which supports the whole 
structure of language, and yet stabilizes itself in relatively autonomous processes.’ 
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2.2. Piecemeal Solutions Conceal the Full Extent of the Dilemma 
 
The shortest way to account for the embodiment of language goes through 
observation of articulator gestures and hand gestures that accompany or replace 
speech, as in sign language: These gestures are what is seen in linguistic 
communication; their neural correlates are the natural candidates for rooting 
language in the body (cf. Goldin-Meadow 1999; Gallagher & Frith 2004; Corina & 
Knapp 2006; Montgomery et al. 2007; Holle et al. 2008; MacSweeney et al. 2008; Xu 
et al. 2009; Emmorey et al. 2010). If the embodiment of language in all its dimens-
ions has little meaning, an obvious short circuit is to look first in the cartographic 
representations of the body in sensorimotor cortical areas as mapped by Penfield 
& Rasmussen (1950) for the potential correlates of the lexicon of action verbs or of 
action sentences (cf. Hauk et al. 2004; Buccino et al. 2005; Pulvermüller 2005; Aziz-
Zadeh 2006; Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). From there, one will address the fol-
lowing problem: whether it is possible to extend what is true for gesture (or the 
motor repertory) to the entire verbal behavior in the hope that the generalization 
reveals the uninterrupted passage between phoneme production/perception and 
construction/interpretation of expressions or sentences. But if gesture is already 
language, basing language on gesture cannot do much to clarify the nature of 
language. If action verbs derive their meaning from actions they express, this is 
not the case in the rest of lexicon. Their metaphorical usage is a semantic 
innovation that might rather undermine than safeguard the link with action. 
 
2.3. The Challenge: Rooting Meaning Morphologies in the Body 
 
The possibility for human beings to express through linguistic expressions 
perceived forms of the visual field and goals or affordances of the practical field 
depends on an underlying mediation between the categories of perception and of 
action presumably to be performed in the last instance in brain circuits. The 
abstract principle of the semantic universality of natural language in the sense of 
Tarski (1936) presupposes such mediation without accounting for it: “If it is 
possible in general to talk of anything whatsoever in a sensible way, then it is 
also possible to talk of that thing in everyday language” (p. 170). One must 
understand step by step how it is possible that any configurations, whether 
objects of visual attention or goals of intended actions — configurations that 
emerge and stabilize in a silent experience — are promoted and safeguarded in 
terms of their expression in linguistic forms. To clarify the transition between the 
morphologies of different eidetic types (not just the linguistic type) that inform 
the conduct of agents-observers-speakers it is not sufficient to trace courses of 
events in brain circuits. The problem of embodiment is not settled at the level of 
neurons because it is both and inextricably eidetic and psychophysiological. 
 
 
3. The Phenomenological Tradition and its Deceptive Proxy 
 
Without lapsing into an outdated imperialism, a philosopher may be surprised 
by what appears to be a revival of the theme of incarnation in the literature on 
embodiment coupled with a misunderstanding, if not a systematic attribution 
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error, of the original sources of this theme. The fact is that the requirement of 
thinking together, and inter-relating, bodily experience with understanding the 
actions of others, action with the perception of the environment, imitation with 
intersubjective communication, dates back to the phenomenological movement in 
the early twentieth century (e.g., Lipps, Dilthey, Husserl, Scheler, Stein, Reinach, 
Heidegger, etc.). However, everything happens as if current neuroscience sought 
a basically inadequate substitute for this phenomenology in authors who hesitate 
between behaviorism and cognitivism, between mentalism and physicalism, bet-
ween computation and simulation (e.g., Liberman, Gibson, Goldman, etc.).  
 
3.1. Liberman, Gibson, Goldman, et alii  
 
Instead of relying on a phenomenology, Liberman’s (1985) conception of arti-
culator gesture seeks to frame phenomena in two successive doctrines: (i) a 
behaviorist concern to assign phonetic units to a coarticulation resistant, 
recordable movement; (ii) an assignment of phonetic encoding and decoding to a 
peripheral system, conforming to the modularity of mind doctrine. Gibson’s 
concept of affordance and ecological theory of perception (1977, 1979) resembles 
a phenomenological description of the morphological structures of Umwelt for a 
living being, but is marred by a physicalism for which the perceptual invariants 
are due to information actually residing in the optical flow. Recycling Goldman’s 
simulation theory (1989, 1992) as functional interpretation of the brain system of 
mirror neurons linking observation and execution of actions does not provide the 
satisfactory alternative that Gallese & Goldman (1998) believe to the theory of the 
mind that subordinates recognition of others to an inference of the cognitive 
subject. That is because, insofar as the observer is supposed to have his own 
motor system objectified as a representation in mind and to use it for predicting 
the future behavior of an observed agent, this so-called simulation remains a 
solipsistic process that takes place entirely in the cognitive system of an isolated 
individual. I’m not specifically trying to prove the reality of these shortcomings 
because they only make sense and present any seriousness from the phenomeno-
logical perspective. Whether they follow the line of Liberman, Gibson, or Gold-
man, their disciples presumably can live without discomfort with the aspects we 
just emphasized of their favorite theories. The point is that none of these 
approaches, despite the attraction they may have for those who seek to embody 
the language in the body, is likely to meet the requirements of a phenomenology 
of embodiment of language, a phenomenology in the lack of which, I contend, 
one will remain stuck midway on the path to embodiment.  
 
3.2. Merleau-Ponty, the One Acceptable Phenomenologist 
 
Merleau-Ponty enjoys in cognitive science a favorable view that is denied to the 
philosopher from whom he borrows his ideas, namely Husserl, especially in his 
later texts on the body and intersubjectivity and the world (Husserl 2008, 1973a). 
This unfair attribution goes so far as to conceal the Husserlian origins of the 
themes of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, despite the fact that he 
himself made no mystery of their provenance. To counterbalance this trend, it is 
noteworthy that Merleau-Ponty’s assimilation of the own body (Leib in contra-
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distinction to Körper) with the body schema of neurologists (cf. Head & Holmes 
1911) is perhaps not the bridge one might think would lead to the functional 
somatotopic maps of current neuroscience. That is not so much because it would 
imply an oversight on his part of the distinction — absolutely essential in 
phenomenology — between the lived body and the body object of science, as any 
attempt at finding neurological — or neuropsychological — correlates of our 
bodily experience cannot but try again crossing the gap to its own risk. It is the 
very authenticity of the phenomenon that was the basis for his classic description 
of bodily experience which is at issue. In fact, although this has not received 
much attention and even if it is surely not enough to tarnish his reputation, 
Merleau-Ponty’s uncritical adherence both to Goldstein’s dogma of Gestalt and 
Goldstein and Gelb (1920) observations of a single case: Schneider, a probable 
simulator warns Goldenberg (2002), casts serious doubt on his description (cf. 
Petit 2010). 
 
3.3. Husserl, the Founder and Transcendantal Scarecrow 
 
In science philosophers are considered producers of theories to be tested 
experimentally. But in Husserl the issue is not of theory but of a lived experience 
— even if it’s a thought experiment — which requires a conversion of attitude in 
anyone who wants to follow suit. That’s what is needed to understand a paradox 
of his phenomenology of language pointed out by Merleau-Ponty (1960): starting 
from an eidetic science of ideal essences of meaning as a priori norms for any 
language (Logische Untersuchungen IV, 1901/1913), Husserl came to the truly 
phenomenological point of view of later texts where: «le langage apparaît comme le 
corps de la pensée pour le sujet parlant qui use de sa langue comme d’un moyen de 
communication avec une communauté vivante»2 (pp. 106–107). That is because we are 
invited by Husserl to take part in a thought experiment: that of the gradual lifting 
of intellectual obstacles enabling the scholar to go beyond the rigid dichotomies 
of a logical understanding to reach a harmonious integration of the two 
dimensions of language: ideality — incarnation  in a single constitutive process. 
 
3.4. Body/Language Ambivalence of Expressions Reconsidered 
 
Whoever approaches language through logical ideality opposes linguistic 
expression and bodily expression, while an embodied conception of language 
allows for a founding continuity leading from one to another. The following 
passages might spot the starting point and end point of this development:  
 
Zu betonen ist, dass auch die so genannten unwillkürlichen „Ausdrücke” 
unserer Seelenlebens, wie Mienenspiel und Geste, zur ausgeschlossenen 
Sphäre gehören, obwohl die gewöhnliche Rede es bei ihnen wie bei den 
sprachlichen Ausdrücken zu sagen gestattet, dass ihre Bedeutung ver-
standen ist.3           (Bedeutungslehre 1908: Husserl 1987: 10) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    2 ‘Language appears as the body of thought to the speaker who uses language as a means of 
communicating with a living community.’ 
    3  ‘It should be stressed that even the so-called involuntary “expressions” of our mental life, 
such as facial expression and gesture belong to the excluded sphere, although the ordinary 
speech permitted to say for them as for the linguistic expressions, that their meaning is 
understood.’ 
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Für Sehende, für Hörende, Sprechende sind die Worte „Ausdrücke”, sind 
die Leiber Ausdrücke, die einen für Mitteilungen an andere Menschen, die 
anderen als Ausdrücke vom Dasein von Personen. Wortausdrücke setzt im 
Ausgedrückten Menschen als ausgeredete und nicht nur redende. Der erste 
und einfachste Ausdruck ist der des leiblichen Aussehens als Menschenleib, 
er setzt natürlich „Sehende” und verstehende voraus”.4 
(Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III, Blg. LVI, 9 Sept. 1935: Husserl 1973a: 665) 
 
 Husserl’s overcoming of a prior Cartesian solipsism which posed 
communication as inessential to thought promoted body expression to the status 
of linguistic expression and his subsequent foundation of subjective experience in 
intersubjectivity involved the founding of expression in communication. That 
said, we must beware of too quickly identify intersubjectivity with empathy and, 
with the latter, the ability for an observer to resonate with the behavior of an 
agent observed, an ability based on the brain system of mirror neurons. 
Einfühlung for Husserl — following Th. Lipps (1903) — is indeed a natural mode 
of perceiving the body of the other as a direct expression of inner life, but let’s not 
lose sight, Ricœur reminds us in Soi-même comme un autre (1990), that it is also an 
ethical imperative one should practice in expressing one’s own inner life, and 
that in this respect it is not obvious to naturalize. The thought process of a 
philosopher through the stages of his work takes a path and this path has some 
continuity — including a logical one — the interpreter would like to recover. But 
the task ahead us is perhaps not the unlikely reconciliation in the context of a 
unifying theory of the positions assumed by Husserl in Logische Untersuchungen, 
where his concern with linguistic expression is dominant, with those of Erfahrung 
und Urteil, where the issue of embodiment becomes central. The well docu-
mented multi-layered character of Husserl’s thinking might inspire us a way out 
of such predicament: Why not deploy the issue of embodiment on as many tracks 
as needed to defuse looming incompatibilities and why do we not engage in 
parallel on all these tracks at once? 
 
 
4. Three Ways to Bridge the Gap between Perception and Action, and 
Language 
 
4.1. Kinaesthesia in the Constitution of Lebenswelt 
 
How is it possible that the chain of physical events do not unfold in me without 
me, but that I have a sensible experience? How is it that visual forms have for me 
the value of independent things in the world or that movements of this body 
carry my (or the other’s) intentions? How is it that expressions heard or produced 
do not simply obey the rules of phonology, syntax and semantics of some 
language (or reflect its statistic regularities), but are endowed with sense for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    4 ‘For sighted people, for hearing people, for speaking people the words are “expressions” the 
bodies are expressions, the former for communicating with other people, the latter as 
expressions of the existence of persons. Verbal expressions suppose humans who express 
themselves as being spoken to, and not just speaking. The first and simplest expression is 
that of the physical appearance as a human body, it is naturally “seeing” and understanding 
in advance.’  
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communicating subjects? To answer these questions Husserl developed his 
theory of constitution. The principle is that any object of experience which ap-
pears to be provided with any value for a subject (including the value of being) 
must be understood transcendentally, i.e. based on subjective conditions of 
possibility qua deriving its value from the subject’s own capability to make sense 
of it. The primary domain of this constitution includes the objects of perception 
and goals of practical actions of an individual subject, but it extends far beyond. 
The constitution of Lebenswelt is an intersubjective foundation of the ordinary life 
world of personal agents in a community, which perceive, act and communicate 
through speech drawing on their own resources and actively mobilizing their 
bodily capabilities of giving meaning. The experience of one’s body and its 
extension through the intropathic experience of the other’s body are operative in 
giving sense to objects through the progressive recruitment of the kinaesthetic 
systems of the body, from ocular to manual movements, and to locomotion. 
Neglect of Husserl’s strong reliance on the kinaesthetic system in our dealing 
(hantieren) with anything whatsoever made of Merleau-Ponty’s construing of 
man’s being in the world as a kind of hantieren a slightly ghostly affair: «Le corps 
hante le monde, etc.».5 The recruitment of the powers of the body in the consti-
tution of the world and its objects cannot fail to interest the neurosciences, at least 
their embodied cognition trend: How do they take up the challenge? For my part, 
I do not see the above considerations as a chapter in the history of philosophy. 
Husserl himself conceived constitution not as the expression of idiosyncratic 
opinions of an individual thinker, but rather as a permanent program of colla-
borative research: Might cognitive neuroscience represent the updated form of 
implementation of such program, thereby achieving a successful naturalization of 
phenomenology (provisionally assuming, although it goes against the grain for 
the community of phenomenologists, that such naturalization is possible and 
desirable)? 
 
4.2. Tracing Neural Events in Brain Circuits of the Speaker: A Unique Pathway 
to Bridge the Gap? 
 
For the first time in history of the knowledge of man we see on the basis of data 
of empirical research a possibility to trace the uninterrupted course of events 
inside the organism that goes from perception and action to communication 
through language. Not content with tracking correlative activity patterns in the 
temporal-frontal circuits of an isolated brain during speech perception (cf. Pul-
vermüller et al. 2003; Pulvermüller 2005), neuroimagery reveals synchronizations 
of such patterns in the brains of communicating individuals (cf. Wilson 2007; 
Schippers 2009, 2010; Stephens 2010). However the narrative of brain events 
involved is far from answering all questions, despite the reductionist appeal of 
such chains of events for any naturalistic explanation of human linguistic 
behavior and capability. At that neuronal level ‘the effort after meaning’, in the 
words of Sir Frederick Bartlett (quoted by Barlow 1985), falls far short of giving a 
univocal ontological genesis. It remains a sequence of mere facts that keep the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    5 ‘The body is haunting the world.’ 
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contingency of what is empirical despite their derivation from the history of 
phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development. As cognitive science, the 
work on the neural basis of language is not just to go back to pure physical 
events: the occurrence of a change of brain state. First, the events that they seek as 
sciences of nature are the regulatory ideas of a consensus expected at the end of 
an ongoing controversy in the community of neuroscientists: Should we say 
‘modulation’ or ‘induction’ or simply ‘spreading of activation’ or even ‘unselec-
tive cortical response to the task’ (cf. Dinstein et al. 2008; Hickok 2008; Mahon & 
Caramazza 2008)? These are not perfectly objective entities that are only what 
they are and whose unambiguous description might be immune to ‘the conflict of 
interpretations’, but rather the likely signature of a behavioral task or the 
language capability this conduct denotes. The fact that correlative brain events 
cannot be taken in isolation from the verbal behavior in ‘ecological’ conditions 
captured by the experimental protocol restores priority to phenomenology of 
language. Speaking of communication between brains as if the dialogue between 
speaking persons were a tale for the public remains a misnomer. 
 
4.3. The Challenge of Part-Whole Semantic Dependency 
 
The electrophysiological discharge of a nerve cell is an individual event so 
riveted to the present modality of its occurrence, that it contains no reserve of 
being to be further determined. Nothing in common with the entity of meaning 
— a semantic category expressed by any syncategorematic expression, one which 
realizes its function by its completion with other expressions of which it contains 
(not in explicit form but only in the signifying intention of the speaker) the empty 
place, a place quite determined, nevertheless, since it specifies a priori the 
category of suitable complementary expressions in the sentence:  
 
Synkategorematika werden als Träger inhaltlich bestimmter Bedeutungs-
momente aufgefasst, die nach einer gewissen Ergänzung verlangen, und 
zwar einer Ergänzung, die, obschon der Materie nach unbestimmt, doch 
ihrer Form nach durch den gegebenen Inhalt mitbestimmt und somit gesetz-
lich umschrieben ist.6 
(Logische Untersuchungen IV § 5 in Husserl 1901/1913: 306). 
 
 The generality of this morphological structure of incompleteness-dependence 
is especially supported by the lastly revived structural syntax of Tesnière (1965), 
that some view as a possible alternative to Chomskyan generative grammar 
theory: «Les connexions entre les mots ne sont indiquées par rien. Mais il est 
indispensable qu’elles soient aperçues par l’esprit sans quoi la phrase ne serait pas 
intelligible» (Eléments A, I, 4)7 (cf. Petitot, 1985, 1995, 2011, 36–37; Pulvermüller 
2002: 139). 
 How is it possible that the brain frees itself from the transient and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    6 ‘Synkategorematika are to be construed as supports of meaning moments of content that re-
quire a certain supplement, and one supplement that, although underdetermined as regard 
the matter, is codetermined in form by the given content and is thus lawfully prescribed.’ 
    7 ‘Connections between words are specified by nothing. But it is essential that they are 
perceived by the mind without which the sentence is not intelligible.’ 
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contingent flux of instantaneous events in its neural circuitry so as to be sensitive 
to dependencies which reflect the regulatory power of semantic categories, 
giving them life and support and impact over time? The question is no longer an 
absolute enigma posed by the phenomenology of language for empirical sciences, 
since the latter were split into a more observational neurophysiology (eventually 
supported by brain imagery) and a theoretical neuroscience working on hypo-
thetical models along the lines of McCulloch & Pitts (1943), and Minsky & Papert 
(1969): One might consider that some naturalization of eidetics (not necessarily 
under that name) is in progress, in so far as the modeling (e.g., in Pulvermüller 
2002: 124, 139, 214) of the detection of rule-governed relations of dependence 
between spatiotemporally non-adjacent elements of the verbal flow by neural 
networks implicitly naturalizes Husserl’s theory of syntactic categories (despite 
its explicit anti-naturalism), as an a priori determination of the possible forms of 
meaning (Logische Untersuchungen IV in Husserl 1901/1913: 295). 
 
4.4. Eidetic Phenomenology and its Geometric Modelling 
 
Phenomenology claims to describe the verbal or perceptual semantic forms 
‘without prejudice’, that is to say remaining at their own level of emergence 
which is that of lived experience, without making assumptions about the 
underlying causal mechanisms of basic brain substrate. His approach may 
perhaps be characterized as essentialist because it treats forms as transcendent 
entities objects of acts of consciousness. Anyway one cannot reproach it to be 
static and to freeze these forms in a Platonic heaven of Ideas, because these 
semantic forms of expression (words, phrases) are typically driven by 
Ergänzungs-bedürftigkeit: the need or requirement of completion which leads these 
forms to become parts of wholes (sentences, speech). Which brings back the 
semantic forms as expressed in discourse to the mereological standard of 
perception (Logische Untersuchungen III in Husserl 1901/1913 and also Ding und 
Raum in Husserl 1973b), suggesting a rule-governed transition from the muteness 
of perceptual (or practical) forms to the expressive forms of language. Along the 
same lines, a geometric morphodynamics (cf. Petitot 1985, 1992, 1999, 2011; Thom 
1988) undertook in the last decades to model the morphogenetic dynamism with 
which semantic forms emerge from the physical substrate, by stabilizing them at 
the phenomenal plane and then transforming each into the other with a view to 
structuring the sense of experience of the speakers. More specifically, the process 
by which objects stand out in the visual field and the process by which 
prepositions apply to configurations of experience may both be represented or 
even reconstructed by equations of differential geometry. These equations were 
independently developed for the purposes of image analysis in computational 
vision, yet they can be interpreted, according to Petitot, as dynamic redeploy-
ment of Husserl’s eidetic description of the constitution of visual objects through 
fusion (Verschmelzung) and separation (Sonderung) of sketches (Abschattungen) by 
gaze movements. Note that the high abstraction of such theoretical program does 
not prevent its promoter from claiming for it the label of Embodiment, which is 
consistent with his assumption of the phenomenological tradition: “The opening 
of the conceptual structure onto the phenomenal world is also an opening onto 
J.-L. Petit 
 
456 
the body. Mind is ‘embodied’ and semiolinguistic structures and universals are 
fundamentally constrained by the compatibility between language, perception 
and action. Hence the spectacular renewal of phenomenological problematics 
(those of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty)” (Petitot 2011: 17–18). 
 
4.5. Lebenswelt: The limit of Body Foundationalism 
 
But will the constitution of the speaking world of communication save all the 
way the corporeal rootedness of the perceived world in kinesthesia? That is a bet 
made by a neuroscience of language that would aspire to naturalize our pheno-
menological experience of meaning. The gamble is rather risky. If only because 
the extension carried out by Einfühlung of the circle of actions and intentions of 
the ego to actions and intentions of others is definitely limited to the current face 
to face interaction. It cannot but stumble on ordinary social acts: (1) accomplished 
through speech, (2) dependent on the reception by the addressee, (3) separating 
in time the utterance and the realization, and (4) building supratemporal and 
immaterial relationships. Illustrating his eidetic analysis of the social acts with a 
familiar example, Reinach (1913) convincingly showed that the socially basic act 
of promising something to someone, and keeping one’s word, owes nothing to 
empathy. In addition to kinaesthesia and Einfühlung or empathy the constitution 
of the verbally articulate Lebenswelt, including idealities of the Law regulating 
social acts, requires the recognition of speech and on top of speech the whole 
‘formalism’ of language as web of reciprocally constitutive (but not purely 
bodily) co-operations. Such transcendentally ultimate constitutive power of lang-
uage in relation to the world of institutional non physical realities we are dealing 
with in daily life no longer depends on kinaesthesia or Einfühlung: Hence the 
skepticism one may have towards the ambitions of a ‘social neuroscience’, such 
as planned by Gallese et al. (2004), looking for the basis of social cognition and 
eventually the roots of sociality in mirror neurons or in cortical maps of the brain. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Faced with issues unresolved by the mere narrative of events in a brain, that 
which is currently presented as a univocal ontological genesis of an embodied 
meaning will predictably break out in three directions: (i) neurophysiologic 
investigation of the organic substrate of the continuous linkage between 
perception and action, and language; (ii) eidetic-geometric morphodynamics as 
norm a priori backing the transformation of forms/schemes in syntactic or 
semantic structures; and (iii) transcendental constitution of the Lebenswelt of a 
community of perceiving-acting personal subjects who interact by words and 
gestures drawing on bodily capabilities and other operations of meaning-giving. 
Of these lines of approach only the first unquestionably ranks in the ideological 
framework of a naturalistic science, while the remaining lines cannot simply be 
fitted into traditional metaphysical dualism. Therefore we plead for an 
epistemology of language that is neither monistic nor dualistic, but rather 
trinitarian, as an alternative to the physicalism of current neuroscience (under its 
embodied disguise). 
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 I might be objected that even a trinitarian approach should at least justify 
the mutual compatibility of the methods it proposes to be carried out in parallel. 
But the cause I am pleading here seems at first sight jeopardized by the 
irreconcilable character of the methods in question. “Monism, as one of my 
reviewers justly remarks, would presumably be the outcome of physical 
reductionism (of cognitive neuroscience), leading to the conclusion that a 
neurophysiologic account will eventually suffice.” How did we come to 
introduce a triplication of approaches? There we came in playing the game of 
naturalizing the phenomenology of embodiment of language by means of 
cognitive neuroscience not by any ideological commitment in favor of physicalist 
naturalism, but to push to its limits this line of research in order to check the 
foreseeable incompleteness of its realization. The call for an eidetics of meaning 
on the one hand, for a transcendental constitution of the Lebenswelt on the other 
hand, is intended to meet the requirements arisen from the recognition of that 
deficiency. As a phenomenologist, I am not primarily concerned with the formal 
correctness of expression of a theory ideally cleaned up from any logical 
imperfections: capturing common intuitions is more important. About the 
embodiment of language, I do not defend a theory of my own: I am happy to 
accompany opportunistically certain research programs of which I have known 
in my narrow limits of scientific information. No excessive modesty in this, 
because I am convinced — with a few others — that the philosopher has no 
territory of its own to defend but is doomed to squat the territory of other 
disciplines. Such a situation does not allow one to ask these disciplines to put in 
coherence their respective approaches. The only mode of compatibility worthy to 
be envisaged is in the philosopher’s Erlebnis: the lived experience of an 
unresolved tension between ultimately possibly incompatible approaches which 
nonetheless impose themselves as contingent context of the quest for truth. 
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